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FAMILY LAW-EXPANDING TRIAL COURTS'
AUTHORITY TO CREATE CONTRACTS DURING
THE EQUITABLE DIVISION OF PROPERTY IN A
DIVORCE ACTION-CESAR V SUNDELIN, 967
N.E.2D 171 (MASS. APP. CT. 2012)
Massachusetts probate courts are given wide discretion to decide
how to divide marital assets in a divorce action.' In a divorce action that
includes a mutually owned family business in the marital estate,
Massachusetts probate courts have the authority to enforce a covenant notto-compete that was bargained for and agreed to by both parties as part of
the "sale" of the family business to one spouse. In Cesar v. Sundelin,3 the
Massachusetts Appeals Court addressed whether Massachusetts probate
courts have the authority to create a covenant not-to-compete, ordering one
spouse not to compete with a jointly owned family business being
distributed in a divorce decree.4 The court held that Massachusetts probate
courts have the authority to create a covenant not-to-compete as part of a
divorce decree.5
During Marina Cesar ("Cesar") and Richard Sundelin's
("Sundelin") marriage, they opened a feed and grain store on Cape Cod. 6
Cesar also worked as a veterinarian during their marriage.7 Each party

I See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 34 (2010) (noting courts can divide both vested and nonvested property regardless of technical title ownership).
2 See Wells v. Wells, 400 N.E.2d 1317, 1318-20 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (holding covenant
not-to-compete agreement included in divorce decree enforceable). Mr. and Mrs. Wells agreed in
a stipulation that was incorporated in their divorce decree that Mr. Wells would sell his stock in
the family business to Mrs. Wells and he would not compete with the business. Id. at 1318.
3 967 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012).
4 Id. at 171 (stating issue before court).
5 Id. (announcing court's holding).
6 Brief & Supplemental Appendix Volume I of II for Plaintiff-Appellee at 5, Cesar v.
Sundelin, 967 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012) (No. 2011-P-0351), 2011 WL 3022093, at *5
[hereinafter Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee] (noting location and timing of store opening); Brief &
Record Appendix of Defendant-Appellant Richard R. Sundelin at 4, Cesar v. Sundelin, 967
N.E.2d 171 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012) (No. 2011-P-0351), 2011 WL 2548560, at *4 [hereinafter
Brief for Defendant-Appellant] (noting timing of store being opened). Cesar and Sundelin were
the sole shareholders of the corporation at issue: Cape Feed and Supply, Inc., which is a sub chapter S corporation. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra, at *5; see also Brief for
Defendant-Appellant, supra, at *4.
7 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 6, at *5; see also Cesar, 967 N.E.2d at 172 (noting
wife is veterinarian).
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indicated early in the divorce proceedings that he or she wanted full control
of the feed and grain store.8 The probate court awarded sole control of the
business to Sundelin after considering the proposed judgment that each
party submitted at the end of the trial. 9
In addition to requesting sole ownership of the business, Sundelin
requested an order prohibiting Cesar from competing with the business. 10

Sundelin first mentioned wanting a covenant not-to-compete as part of the
division of assets after trial."

The probate court judge denied Sundelin's

request for a non-compete order, reasoning that a non-compete order was
beyond the court's authority. 12 Following this order, both parties filed
motions to alter and amend the divorce judgment.' 3 The judge amended
the judgment but did not readdress the non-compete issue that had
previously been decided. 14 On appeal, the Massachusetts Appeals Court
held that the probate court should have considered whether a non-compete
order is appropriate in this case because imposing a non-compete order is
within the probate court's equitable powers.' 5
8 See Cesar, 967 N.E.2d at 171; see also Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 6, at *2;

Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 6, at *4. Cesar filed for divorce on February 19, 2009,
after Cesar and Sundelin had already been separated for approximately a year. See Brief for
Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 6, at *2, *5 (noting date divorce complaint filed and indicating
couple separated in November of 2008).
9 See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 6, at *3 ("In the judgment of divorce, the trial
court ... orders the Wife to 'transfer all of her right, title and interest in the business as well as all
shares of stock in the corresponding Massachusetts sub-chapter S corporation to the Husband."');
see also Cesar, 967 N.E.2d at 171-72 (describing procedural history of case); Brief for
Defendant-Appellant, supra note 6, at *3 (noting judge awarded control of business to Sundelin).
10 See Cesar, 967 N.E.2d at 172 (noting Sundelin attempted to ensure goodwill of business
was protected); see also Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 6, at *3-*4 (noting Sundelin's
request for non-competition order was rejected).
I See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 6, at *3-*4 (explaining Sundelin did not
mention covenant not-to-compete until after trial). In her brief, Cesar specifically noted that
Sundelin did not request a non-compete order in his Answer, Counterclaim, or pre-trial
memorandum and that Sundelin did not file a complaint in equity or use any other mechanism
prior to trial to make this request. Id. at *2-*3,*17 (detailing sequence of events prior to trial).
12 Cesar, 967 N.E.2d at 172 n.3 ("Specifically, the judge stated in his decision, '[C]ertainly
the Court has no authority to do that, and hence will not."'). In addition, the probate court never
explicitly made findings concerning the value of the goodwill in Cape Feed and Supply, Inc. See
id. (noting goodwill could be factored into asset distribution even in absence of specific findings).
13 See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 6, at *4 ("[H]usband argues, inter alia, that the
trial court 'can ... issue a non-compete clause as one of its equitable remedies."' (alteration in
original)); Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 6, at *3 (noting Sundelin's request included
reasons why non-compete can be ordered).
14 See Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 6, at *3 (noting Amended Judgment
did not
include non-compete order or mention request for one); see also supra note 12 and accompanying
text (explaining non-compete order already rejected because it was beyond court's authority).
15 See Cesar, 967 N.E.2d at 173 (vacating portion of judgment supported by judge's lack of
authority to create non-competition order).
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The General Laws of Massachusetts provide probate judges with
broad discretion to determine how to divide the marital assets in a divorce
action and what assets will be included in the marital estate. 16 Probate
judges are given the authority to include any of either spouse's individual

assets in the marital estate-making it subject to division-regardless of17
whether it was obtained before or after the parties were married.

16

See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 34 (2010) (providing jurisdiction and authority to

distribute any part of each spouse's estate); see also Adams v. Adams, 945 N.E.2d 844, 857
(Mass. 2011) ("According broad discretion to the judge's division of property pursuant to the
§ 34 factors 'is necessary in order that the courts can handle the myriad of different fact situations
which surround divorces and arrive at a fair financial settlement in each case."' (quoting Rice v.
Rice, 361 N.E.2d 1305, 1307 (Mass. 1977))); Michael J. Dellergo, Note, The Use of Support
Modification to Re-Litigate Equitably Divided Property in Mfassachusetts: Does Heins v. Ledis
Draw the Line?, 2 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADvOC. 145, 149 (1997) (noting probate court's
discretion "nearly absolute" when determining how marital assets should be divided). However,
in exercising this discretion, probate courts must consider certain factors that are defined in the
statute. See § 34 (defining certain indicators that court must consider, such as length of
marriage); see also Bowring v. Reid, 503 N.E.2d 966, 967-68 (Mass. 1987) (explaining abuse of
discretion analysis in marital distribution cases considers whether factors have been used). The
factors that a judge must consider are:
[T]he length of the marriage, the conduct of the parties during the marriage, the age,
health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills,
employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties, the opportunity of
each for future acquisition of capital assets and income, and the amount and duration of
alimony, if any, awarded under sections 48 to 55, inclusive.
§ 34. Massachusetts has a low divorce rate compared to other states; however, in 2009 there were
still 27,445 divorce cases filed in Massachusetts' probate courts. See I Don 't: Divorce Rates by
State,
WALL
ST.
J.,
Aug.
13,
2010,
http://s.wsj.net/public/resources/documents/st DIVORCE 20100813.html
(showing
that
Massachusetts has divorce rate of two divorces per 1000 people); Fiscal Year 2011 Statistics,
PROB.
&
FAM.
CT.
DEPARTMENT,
http://www.mass.gov/courts/courtsandjudges/courts/probateandfamilycourt/sunmmarystats2Oll 1.html (last updated Nov. 9, 2011, 9:00 AM) (detailing filing rates in Massachusetts probate
courts).
17 See § 34 (specifying past, present, and future assets are within jurisdiction of court).
Massachusetts has included in its statutes the common law principle of a "hotchpot" system,
which provides that there are no boundaries for assets belonging to one spouse. See Elijah L.
Milne, Re characterizingSeparate Property at Divorce, 84 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 307, 312 n.44
(2007) (noting Massachusetts' use of common law "hotchpot" system). Despite this broad
authority, the Supreme Judicial Court has recognized some minimal exceptions such as assets
that are too speculative when assets cannot be included in the marital estate. See Adams, 945
N.E.2d at 858 (holding profit-sharing arrangements can be included in estate because such
arrangements not too speculative); Drapek v. Drapek, 503 N.E.2d 946, 949-50 (Mass. 1987)
(recognizing medical license too speculative to be included in marital estate). Providing such
broad discretion has been criticized as creating "uncertainty and unpredictability" in divorce
proceedings, which is likely to result in similar facts being treated differently from one case to the
next. See Milne, supra, at 3 15 (noting too much discretion can "lead to inconsistent and disparate
results"). Milne suggests that unpredictable property division systems discourage settlement,
increase the cost of divorce litigation, and favor the spouse that is more willing to take risks. Id.
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Massachusetts probate courts also have the discretion to award alimony as
part of the divorce order. 8 Regardless of the level of discretion a state
provides to its probate judges, most states recognize that the goodwill of a
commercial company is a marital asset if one spouse owns that company.19
Goodwill of a company that is being sold outside of divorce proceedings is
sometimes protected by negotiating a covenant not-to-compete.20 Some

at 314-15 ("The lack of predictability that broad judicial discretion engenders impedes settlement,
promotes protracted, expensive, and often bitter litigation, and also 'gives those willing to gamble
a negotiating advantage over a more risk-averse spouse."'). By using the hotchpot system,
Massachusetts probate courts have more authority over each spouse's assets than most other state
probate courts. See Marsha Garrison, What's Fair in Divorce Property Distribution: CrossNational Perspectivesfrom Survey Evidence, 72 LA. L. REV. 57, 60 (2011) (noting minority of

districts allow judges to include all assets in marital estate); Marshal S. Willick, The Evolving
Concept of Marriage and Coming Convergence of Marital and Non-Marital Property and

Support Law, NEV. LAW., May 2011, at 6, 7 (noting minority of jurisdictions use hotchpot
system). However, in most states' judges do have discretion to determine how to divide the
property that is within the marital estate. See Garrison, supra, at 68-69. Only a few states have
limited judicial discretion to determine what portion of the estate each spouse should receive by
creating a presumption of equitable distribution. Garrison, supra, at 70 (explaining few
jurisdictions require or have presumption of equitable distribution).
18 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208 § 53 (2012) (requiring probate courts to consider certain
factors in determining alimony); CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR. & MONROE L. INKER, 2A MASS.
PRAC., FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE § 40:2 (3d ed. 2012) (noting court's discretion to use

alimony, property distribution, or both to address parties' finances); see also Adams, 945 N.E.2d
at 857 (explaining probate judge denied wife's alimony request because equitable distribution
would appropriately provide for wife). Unlike property distribution, an alimony award can be
modified after the divorce proceeding as circumstances change.

See KINDREGAN & INKER,

supra, at § 40:3 ("[A]limony is subject to modification whereas an order of property division is
final and is not modifiable."); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 37 (2010) (providing
authority for probate court to modify alimony payments after divorce judgment). Massachusetts
courts have recognized that "double dipping" may occur because both alimony and equitable
distribution can be awarded, and both require consideration of the same factors. See Adams, 945
N.E.2d at 873. As a result, courts suggest that probate courts should make efforts to avoid
"double dipping." See id. ("Massachusetts has also looked with disfavor at so-called 'doubledipping,' a term used to describe 'the seeming injustice that occurs when property is awarded to
one spouse in an equitable distribution of marital assets and is then also considered as a source of
income for purposes of imposing support obligations."' (quoting Adlakha v. Adlakha, 844 N.E.2d
700, 705-06 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006))).
19 See J. Thomas Oldham, Changes in the Economic Consequencesof Divorces, 1958-2008,

42 FAM. L.Q. 419, 430 (2008) (noting goodwill considered divisible asset by most states);
Carmen Valle Patel, Note, Treating Professional Goodwill as larital Property in Equitable

Distribution States, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 554, 561-63 (1983) (explaining when goodwill is
generally considered divisible asset); see also Garrison, supra note 17, at 60 (noting most
jurisdictions only allow probate courts to divide property obtained during marriage). One author
suggests that it is critical for a court to include goodwill as one of the marital assets to be divided
because it can be a significant asset. See Randall B. Wilhite, The Effect of Goodwill in
Determining the Value of a Business in a Divorce, 35 FAM. L.Q. 351, 381 (2001) (noting

importance of including goodwill in valuation of marital estate).
20 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 420 (9th ed. 2009) ("Noncompetition covenants are valid

to protect business goodwill in the sale of a company.").
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probate courts have recognized a covenant
distributable asset in a divorce proceeding. 2'

not-to-compete

as a

A covenant not-to-compete or a noncompetition agreement
generally arises between an employee and employer or is associated with

the sale of a business.22 Courts in most states have the authority to assess
the reasonableness of a covenant not-to-compete and to find unreasonable
covenants to be unenforceable. 23 A Massachusetts court that finds a
covenant not-to-compete to be unreasonable has authority to alter or
change the covenant to make it reasonable.24 Although reasonableness is

21

See Holland v. Holland, 35 P.3d 409, 415 (Wyo. 2001) (holding covenant not-to-compete

negotiated by divorcing parties is valid and enforceable); see also Wells v. Wells, 400 N.E.2d
1317, 1318 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (recognizing mutually agreed upon covenant not-to-compete
can be incorporated in divorce decree).
22 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 420 (9th ed. 2009) (noting noncompetition agreements
generally arise "in a sale-of-business, partnership, or employment contract"). A covenant not-tocompete is an agreement "not to engage in the same type of business for a stated time in the same
market as the buyer, partner, or employer." Id. This type of agreement was considered an
unenforceable restraint on trade under English common law. See Russell Beck, THE LAW OF
RESTRICTIVE

COVENANTS:

NEGOTIATING,

DRAFTING,

AND

ENFORCING

NONCOMPETITION

(Mass. Continuing Legal Educ., Inc.
ed., 4th ed. 2010) (noting ban on covenants not-to-compete continued in English common law
until 1621).
23 See Samuel C. Damren, The Theory of "Involuntary" Contracts: The JudicialRewriting of
Unreasonable Covenants Not to Compete, 6 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 71, 72 (1999) (discussing
use of reasonableness test in analyzing covenants not-to-compete); see also Beck, supra note 22,
at § 2 ("'Under Massachusetts contract law, noncompetition agreements [and similar restrictive
covenants] are enforceable to the extent that they are reasonable and necessary to protect the
employer's legitimate interests while not interfering with ordinary competition."' (quoting IKON
Office Solutions, Inc. v. Belanger, 59 F. Supp. 2d 125, 128 (D. Mass. 1999))). Two courts that
have reviewed the enforceability of covenants not-to-compete that were voluntarily agreed upon
by divorcing parties during the divorce negotiations have analyzed the reasonableness of the
covenants using the criteria generally used for an agreement signed during the sale of a business.
See Wells, 400 N.E.2d at 1320 (holding covenant enforceable using factors typically used to
evaluate covenants agreed upon in business sale); Holland, 35 P.3d at 415 ("[D]isposition of
property in a marriage dissolution proceeding action is analogous to the sale of a business .... ").
In Holland, the court held the covenant was enforceable, reasoning that it was similar to the sale
of the business because the husband had "voluntarily agreed to the covenant as part of ann's
length negotiations and without coercion from the district court, he received in excess of
$300,000.00 as consideration for his agreement (as well as receiving all of the parties' real
property, much of which was income producing) .... " 35 P.3d at 415.
24 See Kroeger v. Stop & Shop Cos., 432 N.E.2d 566, 571 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) (approving
trial judge's alteration of covenant not-to-compete). Some states have held that a judge has the
authority to void specific terms of the agreement, or the agreement in its entirety, if it is found to
be unreasonable, but it is beyond judicial discretion to rewrite an unreasonable agreement. See
Damren, supra note 23, at 72 ("[A] majority of jurisdictions either eliminate ('blue pencil') these
terms or void the entire restrictive covenant."). Courts' authority to rewrite previously agreed
upon agreements has been criticized as perverting the voluntary nature of the original agreement.
See id. at 73. One potential concern is that the newly rewritten agreement does not compensate
the party who bargained for the unfair term, leaving that party with conditions for which he did
AGREEMENTS AND RELATED RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, § 1
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the general standard, courts in Massachusetts conduct a less searching

review of a covenant not-to-compete that is included as part of an
agreement to sell a business than would be conducted for a similar
agreement made in the employer-employee context.25

States are split as to whether it is acceptable for probate courts to
impose a covenant not-to-compete as part of the equitable property division
in a divorce proceeding.26 Some states reason that courts can impose
covenants not-to-compete in a divorce decree because the order is vital to
the protection of the goodwill of a business that is being distributed in the

action.27 In contrast, states that have found it inappropriate for a probate
court to impose a covenant not-to-compete as part of asset distribution are
reluctant to grant the courts more authority over a spouse's future earnings
and profession.
In Cesarv. Sundelin, the Massachusetts Appeals Court emphasized
the broad and flexible statutory authority that probate judges have to divide
marital assets to support its finding that probate judges have the authority
to order covenants not-to-compete.2 9 The court further explained that
because the authority is flexible, there does not need to be any express

not negotiate. See id.
25 See Beck, supra note 22, at § 2 (noting different level of review for covenants not-tocompete in employment context); see also Boulanger v. Dunkin' Donuts Inc., 815 N.E.2d 572,
577 (Mass. 2004) ("In the context of the sale of a business, courts look 'less critically' at
covenants not to compete because they do not implicate an individual's right to employment to
the same degree as in the employment context.").
26 See 54A AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 942 (2012) (explaining only
some jurisdictions allow courts to order non-competition in divorce decree). Compare In re
Marriage of Fischer, 834 P.2d 270, 273 (Colo. App. 1992) (allowing creation of covenant), and
Kelly v. Kelly, 806 N.W.2d 133, 144 (N.D. 2011) (affirming order not to interfere with family
business for five years imposed in divorce action), with Favell v. Favell, 957 P.2d 556, 559-60
(Okla. Civ. App. 1997) (noting covenant by definition is agreement, not order), and Ulmer v.
Ulmer, 717 S.W.2d 665, 667-68 (Tex. App. 1986) (noting "individual's right to practice his
profession is not subject to division by the court.").
27 See In re Mfarriage ofFischer, 834 P.2d at 271-72 (reasoning imposition of covenant notto-compete appropriate if goodwill included as part of business's value); Kelly, 806 N.W.2d at
144 (noting covenants not-to-compete can be created if tied to court's authority to protect
company's goodwill). In In re Afarriage of Fischer, the lower court included goodwill in the
value of the business, which was awarded to the wife. See 834 P.2d at 272. The lower court
concluded, and the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, that it had the authority and the
responsibility to protect the goodwill of the business with a covenant not-to-compete. See id. at
272.
28 See Favell, 957 P.2d at 561 (noting spouses' "future earning capacity . .. is not marital
property to be divided"); Ulmer, 717 S.W.2d at 667-68 (noting "individual's right to practice his
profession is not subject to division by the court").
29 See 967 N.E.2d 171, 172-73 (noting "equity powers of a probate judge are 'broad and
flexible"' (quoting In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712, 718 (1982))).
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statutory authority to support an equitable action.30 The Massachusetts
Appeals Court reasoned that since goodwill is part of the marital estate, it is
subject to the broad equitable powers of a probate judge in the equitable
distribution of the estate. 3
After holding that probate judges have the authority to impose a
covenant not-to-compete, the Massachusetts Appeals Court declined to
comment as to whether the authority could be exercised in this case. 3 2 The
Massachusetts Appeals Court reasoned there was no need to reach the
questions of covenant reasonableness or whether the husband's insistence
on a covenant was timely because the probate judge based his rejection of
the covenant on a presumed lack of authority.33 The Massachusetts
Appeals Court held that probate judges have the authority to act equitably,
including ordering an involuntary covenant not-to-compete,
but left the
34
probate judges to interpret how far that authority extends.
The extension of the probate court's power to include creating
contracts that control one or both spouses' professional future is
particularly problematic when considering the expansive power over all
assets of divorcing individuals given to Massachusetts probate judges.3 5
Prior to Cesar, Massachusetts probate courts already had the discretion to
include both assets that were acquired before marriage and that will vest
after marriage in the marital estate for equitable distribution. 36 Moreover,
by valuing the business goodwill lower if the individual spouse is critical to
30
31
32

Id.
Id. at 172.
Id. at 173 ("We stress the limited nature of our ruling. We state no position as to whether

the husband is entitled to a noncompete order .... ").
33 Cesar, 967 N.E.2d at 172-73 (vacating only portion of judgment based upon
lack of
authority).
34

Id.

35 See id. (holding probate courts have authority to order covenant not-to-compete); supra
notes 16-17 and accompanying text (noting Massachusetts probate court's broad authority and
discretion in divorce action); Milne, supra note 17, at 314-15 (explaining too much judicial
discretion creates unpredictable divorce proceedings); see also supra note 28 and accompanying
text (explaining imposition of covenant not-to-compete gives judicial authority over parties'
professions).
Elijah Milne suggests that the unpredictability of a hotchpot system is
disadvantageous to the risk-adverse spouse. See Milne, supra note 17, at 314-15. After Cesar,
the unpredictability will only increase because, in addition to the entirety of both spouses' assets,
probate courts can now limit one spouse's ability to practice his or her profession. See Cesar,
967 N.E.2d at 173; Milne, supra note 17, at 314-15.
36 See supra note 17 and accompanying text (noting breadth of court's authority over
property); see also Garrison, supra note 17, at 68-69 (explaining majority of states do not give
courts authority over all of both spouses' assets). Massachusetts probate courts also have the
authority to impose future support orders between the spouses through alimony orders. See supra
note 18 and accompanying text (explaining alimony can be used in combination with distribution
of assets to settle parties' finances).
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the business, the court already has the mechanism to make the agreement
fair without imposing a covenant not-to-compete. 3 7 It is unnecessary to
also provide the court with a mechanism to force parties into an involuntary

contract that limits their professional futures.38
Furthermore, in making its decision, the Massachusetts Appeals

Court failed to consider several questions: first, how creating a covenant
would affect the factors already considered to determine alimony and the
appropriate property distribution; and second, how this authority fits within

the current Massachusetts jurisprudence concerning covenants not-tocompete.39

Currently, a probate court is required to consider the
. . . [and]
employability" when determining how to distribute items in the marital
estate and whether to award alimony. 40 As a result of this court's failure to

"occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills,

37 See supra note 19 and accompanying text (noting goodwill is divisible asset in divorce
proceeding). Furthermore, a court can impose a more flexible agreement that would allow the
order to be re-evaluated on motion of either party by using alimony. See supra note 18 and
accompanying text (noting alimony can be used but also is subject to modification). Prior to this
decision, the Supreme Judicial Court recognized that Massachusetts General Laws chapter 208,
section thirty-four provides discretion to the court to handle a variety of factual situations. See
Adams v. Adams, 945 N.E.2d 844, 857 (Mass. 2011) (explaining factors enumerated in statute
provided appropriate amount of flexibility). Despite that vote of confidence, the discretion
already provided creates a potential problem of double-dipping forcing one spouse to pay twice
via property division and alimony which creates uncertainty in how the end result of a divorce
proceedings would compare with the result of a similar factual situation. See Milne, supra note
17, at 315 (explaining discretion leads to different results for similar factual situations); see also
supra note 18 and accompanying text (explaining how use of same factors for alimony and
equitable distribution could result in double-dipping).
38 See supra note 37 and accompanying text (explaining various mechanisms already
available to judges to appropriately divide assets); supra note 28 and accompanying text
(explaining other courts have recognized flaw in giving probate court authority over an
individual's profession). It has been recognized as contrary to public policy to involuntarily
impose limitations on an individual's ability to work. See Boulanger v. Dunkin' Donuts Inc., 815
N.E.2d 572, 578 (Mass. 2004) (expressing greater concern about employment covenants because
greater effect on "an individual's right to employment"); Favell v. Favell, 957 P.2d 556, 561
(Okla. Civ. App. 1997) (noting strong public policy and legislative limitations on parties' ability
to voluntarily agree to restraints); Beck, supra note 22, at § 2 (explaining court particularly
concerned about involuntary agreements that limit ability to work); see also Beck, supra note 22,
at § 1 (noting covenants not-to-compete traditionally not allowed).

39 See infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text (noting factors for determining alimony and
equitable distribution and risks already present); see infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text
(explaining potential for agreements to be unreviewable or to only receive cursory review). See
generally Cesar, 967 N.E.2d at 171-73 (neglecting to mention how decision affects alimony and
asset distribution or covenant review procedure).
40 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 34 (2010) (noting factors judge must consider prior to
awarding alimony or dividing marital assets); see also Adams, 945 N.E.2d at 873 (noting alimony
awards should be determined using same factors as are used to distribute property); Bowring v.
Reid, 503 N.E.2d 966, 968 (Mass. 1987) (explaining abuse of discretion analysis starts with
determining if factors were used).
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provide guidelines for the implementation of a court ordered covenant, or
to discuss how a lower court's action in limiting one spouse's ability to be
employed or produce income affects these considerations, it will be even
more complicated for probate courts to avoid inappropriately valuing and
distributing assets that are uncertain while adjusting for new limits on a
spouse's profession. 41 Furthermore, given the inability to modify property
distributions, the court should have explained when or if these involuntary
contracts could be modified. 42 Involuntary covenants not-to-compete
imposed by a court should be reviewable with a more searching review-as
is done with employment covenants not-to-compete-because it is as
coercive as an employment contract and affects future employment of a
spouse. 43 The Massachusetts Appeals Court's failure to address this issue
makes it likely that even if the covenants are seen to be reviewable, the
court ordered agreements will be inappropriately analyzed in the less
searching model provided for agreements not-to-compete made as part of
the sale of the business.44
Finally, the court did not have to reach the question of whether a
probate court can impose a covenant. 45 Imposing a covenant not-tocompete is contrary to contract theories because it is not based on a mutual
agreement. 46 However, here the covenant-not-compete was not raised by
Sundelin until after Cesar had submitted her proposed judgment.47 The

41 See supra note 40 and accompanying text (noting factors currently considered); see also
supra note 18 (explaining how current system creates potential for "double-dipping"); Dellergo,
supra note 16, at 159 (noting use of alimony and equitable distribution fails to provide any
finality for parties).
42 See KINDREGAN & INKER, supra note 18, at § 38:2 (explaining property division final but

alimony orders can be modified).
43 See supra note 25 and accompanying text (noting less stringent review used for covenants
related to sale of business); see also Holland v. Holland, 35 P.3d 409, 415 (Wyo. 2001)
(explaining covenant was reasonable partially because husband "voluntarily agreed . .. without
coercion from the district court").
44 See Wells v. Wells, 400 N.E.2d 1317, 1318-20 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (using sale of
business reasonableness criteria to evaluate covenant entered into during divorce); see also supra
note 22 and accompanying text (noting covenants not-to-compete generally mutually entered into
either during sale of business or employment).
45 See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 6, at *3-*4 (explaining Sundelin did
not
mention covenant not-to-compete until after trial); Damren, supra note 23, at 78 (discussing
criticism of court's authority to strike covenant terms grounded in changed original agreement).
46 See supra note 22 and accompanying text (stating covenant not-to-compete created
through mutual agreement); see also Favell v. Favell, 957 P.2d 556, 559-60 (Okla. Civ. App.
1997) (explaining that covenant needs to be based on agreement); Damren, supra note 23, at 7376 (noting criticism of authority to rewrite contracts because changes mutually agreed upon
terms).
47 See supra note 11 and accompanying text (noting Sundelin did not raise wanting covenant not-to compete prior to trial); see also Damren, supra note 23, at 78 (explaining criticism of
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timing of Sundelin's request did not give Cesar an adequate opportunity to
strategically position herself to argue for an equitable division of marital
assets-a situation akin to a court rewriting terms of a contract to remove
items that one party had negotiated.48 The court could have simply
dismissed Sundelin's appeal without declaring that probate courts have the
power to create covenants.49

In Cesar v. Sundelin, the Massachusetts Appeals Court decided that
probate courts have the authority to impose a covenant-not-to compete on a
spouse in a divorce action. This is an unwarranted expansion of the already
sweeping power of the probate court, as it allows the probate court to affect
the spouse's ability to work in addition to deciding what happens with his
or her property. Further, the Court did not have to decide this issue
because the covenant was clearly inappropriate for the facts at bar.
Nevertheless, after deciding to expand the power, the court should have
provided careful guidance to limit the impact of this decision as opposed to
leaving it open for dispute. Divorcing couples engaged in a mutual
business venture can anticipate even more uncertainty in their financial
futures-including for some spouses, his or her future earning
opportunities-because the court failed to take those steps.
Lindsay Potter

court's authority to strike terms in covenants grounded in changing original agreement). A major
issue with allowing a court to strike terms of an agreement is the lack of compensation for a party
who loses a bargained for term. See Damren, supra note 23, at 72 (noting court's change to
voluntary agreements takes away bargained-for terms without compensation). Here, Cesar
presented evidence relevant to other issues at trial but did not present a defense concerning the
effect of a non-competition agreement. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 6, at *3
(explaining lack of notice of covenant-not-to compete).
48 See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 6, at *3-*4 (stating timing of request);
Damren, supra note 23, at 72, 78 (noting criticism of court rewriting agreements).
49 C.f Cesar v. Sundelin, 967 N.E.2d 171, 173 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012) (explaining
court
specifically did not address Cesar's arguments of issue being waived).

